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Abstract—Clinical workflows are safety critical workflows as 
they have the potential to cause harm or death to patients. Their 
safety needs to be considered as early as possible in the 
development process. Effective safety analysis methods are 
required to ensure the safety of these high-risk workflows, 
because errors that may happen through routine workflow could 
propagate within the workflow to result in harmful failures of the 
system’s output. This paper shows how to apply an approach for 
safety analysis of clinical workflows to analyse the safety of the 
workflow within a radiology department and evaluates the 
approach in terms of usability and benefits. The outcomes of 
using this approach include identification of the root causes of 
hazardous workflow failures that may put patients’ lives at risk. 
We show that the approach is applicable to this area of 
healthcare and is able to present added value through the 
detailed information on possible failures, of both their causes and 
effects; therefore, it has the potential to improve the safety of 
radiology and other clinical workflows. 
Keywords—clinical workflows; safety analysis; radiology; HiP-
HOPS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Clinical workflow as defined by [1] is a term that is used to 
describe the healthcare activities that are performed carefully 
by more than one member to accomplish a clinical process 
(e.g. treatment or diagnosis) and to produce a certain clinical 
service. 
Due to the growing number of adverse events, risk 
management of healthcare activities, the issue of patient safety, 
medical errors prevention and adverse events reporting are 
broadly studied nowadays. A report in 1999 entitled “To Err is 
Human: Building a Safer Health System” which was released 
by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) stated that errors cause 
between 44000 and 98000 deaths every year in American 
hospitals and over one million injuries [1]. Moreover, around 
425,000 patients (5% of total) admitted to hospitals in England 
and Wales each year experience adverse events from medical 
errors [2]. 
So, clinical workflows can be described as safety critical 
workflows because they have the potential to cause harm or 
death to patients. Their safety needs to be considered as early 
as possible in their development process, where the safety 
analysis results can be used to refine the models and to derive 
more detailed functional models and specifications of the 
workflow.  
In [3] an approach to safety analysis of clinical workflows 
was proposed, which is explained in the next section. The 
approach is applied to a case study and an evaluation of the 
approach and its benefits is shown through the paper. 
II.  AN APPROACH FOR SAFETY ANALAYSIS OF  CLINICAL  
WORKFLOWS 
The following figure shows an approach for safety analysis 
of clinical workflows proposed by [3]: 
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Fig.1. An Approach to Safety Analysis of Clinical Workflows [3] 
The approach is designed to support the development and 
safety analysis of clinical workflows. It starts with the process 
of requirements generation where the workflow is documented 
in order to understand it, then the workflow documentation is 
translated into models by the safety analyst and the healthcare 
team. After that the safety analyst - in cooperation with the 
healthcare team - start the process of hazards identification in 
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order to extend the models with the local behavior of each 
component, and then in an automatic manner the tool  
(Hierarchically-Performed Hazard Origin and Propagation 
Studies (HiP-HOPS)) generates both Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA) and Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) results. 
These results are qualitative in the sense that they show how 
the failure of a single component or combinations of failures of 
different components can lead to system failure. If the results 
of qualitative analyses are enough then the new workflow 
design can be generated based on the outcomes of the analyses.  
Otherwise, if quantitative analysis is required then it has to be 
done before starting with the new workflow design. Finally, if 
the workflow requirements are achieved then the workflow can 
be accredited.  
FTA [4] is a common safety analysis technique through 
which root causes of an undesired event are identified. It is a 
deductive technique which determines how an undesired event 
(often termed the top event) can be caused by lower level 
failures (or events) or their combinations. Quantitative analysis 
of the FTA can be implemented to calculate the probability of 
the top event and qualitative analysis is performed to identify 
the necessary and sufficient combinations of events which can 
cause the top event (termed Minimal Cut Sets (MCS)). 
Quantitative analysis of a fault tree, which follows qualitative 
analysis, can help to estimate the probability of the top event 
occurring from the given failure rates of basic failure modes of 
the system.  Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), on the 
other hand, is an inductive safety analysis technique that 
examines the effect of lower level (component) failures 
towards the higher-level system failures. FTA and FMEA has a 
wide use in exploring and analysing healthcare issues related to 
patient safety (e.g. [5]; [6]; [7]), and they showed their ability 
to analyse clinical processes. Automated FTA and FMEA 
would present and provide more efficiency in analysing 
clinical processes. 
HiP-HOPS which was initially proposed by [8], is a state-
of-the-art technique, which has been prominently used in 
mechanical systems to effectively identify weak points in 
system design. It is a predictive safety analysis technique 
which enables semi-automated FTA and FMEA. In other 
words, it incorporates, automates, and integrates a number of 
classical techniques. The current implementation of the HiP-
HOPS has the design optimisation capability that can help to 
select component and subsystem among different alternatives 
as well as helps to decide the level and location of replicated 
components.  
HiP-HOPS works in combination with a number of 
frequently used system modelling tools or packages (e.g. 
Matlab Simulink), from which it receives block diagrams of 
systems being analysed and associated failure behaviour.  It 
includes three main phases: a modelling phase, a synthesis 
phase, and an analysis phase where MCSs and FMEA are 
generated. The process starts when designers build a model of 
the system, then they annotate the model and its components 
with detailed failure information. Internal failure information 
can be annotated into the components as a set of Boolean 
expressions that are manually added to each component to 
describe how failures of the component output can be caused 
by a single input failure and/or a combination of input failures 
and/or by internal malfunctions of the component itself. These 
expressions essentially represent the component fault trees of 
the system components describing the generation, propagation, 
and transformation of failures between the inputs and outputs 
of the components. After defining the behaviour of a 
component, the component can be stored in the library to allow 
greater degree of reusability. 
Qualitative analysis is performed based on the logical 
failure behaviour of the components and it starts with a top 
event (system failure) and traverses the model by following the 
propagation of the failures backwards from the top level of the 
system towards the basic component level. The outcome of this 
process is a fault tree showing the failure behaviour of the 
whole system. As this fault tree is relatively complex therefore 
it is minimised by applying logical rules to obtain minimal cut 
sets. As part of the qualitative analysis, FMEA is also 
generated from the fault trees. 
In addition to the logical failure behaviour of the 
components, numerical data (e.g. failure rate, severity of the 
component) can also be entered for the components. 
Quantitative analysis can be performed based on the numerical 
data entered for the components. As seen in Figure 1, the 
quantitative analysis is optional in the proposed approach. 
However, if quantitative analysis is required and sufficient data 
for the analysis are available then it is possible to quantify the 
fault tree to get the probability of the top event. As MCSs of 
the fault tree are represented as the conjunction (AND gate) of 
the statistically independent basic failure modes therefore the 
probability of a MCS be obtained using the following equation. 
                      (    )  ∏ (   )
 
   
                                      ( ) 
Where   (    ) is the probability of the minimal cut set i 
and  (   ) is the probability of the basic event j. 
Since the top event is represented as the disjunction (OR 
gate) of the MCSs, therefore, the top event probability can be 
calculated as [9]: 
             (         )    ∏(   (    ))
 
   
                ( ) 
where  (         ) is the probability of the top event. 
In the clinical workflows, a lot of human activities are 
involved; therefore, human errors are expected to constitute a 
great proportion of the basic failure modes. It is relatively easy 
to quantify the failure probability of mechanical components; 
in contrast, it is difficult to quantify the probability of the 
human error due to the uncertainty involved in quantifying 
human behaviour. So, uncertainty in human behaviour may 
require to be considered in the quantitative analysis. One 
possible way is to translate the fault tree into Bayesian 
Networks (BNs) using the method shown in [10] and then 
perform the probabilistic analysis because BNs are considered 
as efficient methods for performing probabilistic inference 
under uncertainty.   
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HiP-HOPS can in general be applied to systems that 
involve data, information or material flow. However, in our 
case “components” may represent clinical processes, humans, 
tasks,  or any other components of a clinical workflow 
architecture. 
HiP-HOPS was proposed by [11] to analyse the safety of 
the workflow of a home Telemonitoring system. This paper 
applies an integrated approach which utilises HiP-HOPS to 
conduct safety analysis of a RIS/PACS workflow. The result of 
the analysis is the root causes of different failures, and their 
direct and indirect effects on both the workflow and the 
patients themselves. 
III. APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH TO A CASE STUDY 
Radiology Information Systems (RIS) and Picture 
Archiving and Communication Systems (PACS) technology 
has advanced dramatically in recent years, including the 
technology of acquiring, storing, retrieving, displaying, and 
distributing clinical images [12]. It has become a mature 
technology and has been commonly implemented in a number 
of developed countries [13]. Different systems have been 
designed and developed to assist different workflows in the 
radiology departments in several hospitals. In Jordan for 
example, RIS/PACS are implemented in a number of private, 
government, and military hospitals. To investigate the concerns 
that medical staff have due to the adoption of RIS/PACS 
systems, we conducted a number of interviews in one of the 
Jordanian hospitals. These were followed by another set of 
interviews to document the workflow in the radiology 
department in the same hospital, where RIS/PACS has been 
adopted. We found that faults and errors in the workflows 
might lead to harmful failures in the outputs (e.g. producing a 
report that has an incorrect description of the patient‟s 
situation, or leading to undesired reactions by the patient). 
Having the wrong report potentially results in an incorrect 
diagnosis and treatment, placing the patient‟s life at risk, while 
the effect of having unwanted side effects by the patient varies 
depending on how serious these effects are.  
With this prevalence of RIS/PACS in healthcare 
institutions, there is a growing need to analyse their workflow 
safety, both ensuring the safety of the workflow design and the 
safety during the operational phase. In other words, securing 
the design of the theoretical workflow in terms of safety issues, 
and then making sure about following this workflow in the 
operational phase. Analysing and modelling the workflow 
plays an important role in medical information technology 
projects, as the implementation of these systems requires an  
understanding of the processes involved in them [14]. 
A RIS as defined by [15] is a computer system designed to 
support operational workflow and business analysis within a 
radiology department; it is a repository of patient data and 
reports which contributes to the electronic patient record (EPR) 
or electronic health record (EHR). [15] described the RIS as an 
imaging information system since it supports many additional 
specialists in areas including nuclear medicine, radiotherapy, 
and endoscopy. 
As a RIS contributes to EHRs, then any errors in these 
systems propagate to affect the EHRs, which may put 
clinicians in a situation where they make wrong diagnosis and 
consequently put patients‟ lives at risk.  
The interviews showed that one of the main concerns about 
adopting the RIS/PACS systems is the potential lack of 
reliability and thus lack of safety of these systems; this is due 
to the difference between the theoretical workflow and the 
operational workflow. Furthermore, even the theoretical 
workflow possibly has many problems with its safety, as where 
the safety issue was not addressed specifically during the 
workflow design. This leads to output failures of different parts 
of the workflow and eventually failure of the final output of the 
system. These failures of outputs can be defined by output 
deviations, where an output deviation outlines a set of Boolean 
expressions that shows the causes of the output failure, and the 
relationships between them. These causes can involve internal 
failures, input deviations, or both. 
There is a scarcity of published literature addressing the 
problem of analysing the operational workflow and its safety. 
It is uncommon to have a formal automated safety analysis in 
healthcare for the management of healthcare systems‟ 
operational workflows such as the workflow within the 
radiology department. Little information is available regarding 
operational errors in RIS/PACS workflows (e.g. [7]). Research 
to date has not identified efficient automated approaches for 
workflow errors risk reduction. Many aspects of RIS/PACS 
design can be changed through the safety analysis of the 
workflow, as a flawed workflow design has the potential to 
decrease the efficiency and increase user errors during the 
operational phase of the workflow. 
In the face of these limitations, this paper identifies 
potential significant errors in a RIS/PACS workflow by means 
of the following: 
 Using an integrated safety analysis approach to analyse 
the safety of the RIS/PACS workflow 
 Using the results of the empirical study to document 
and model both the detailed processes and the in depth 
tasks of one failure scenario of this workflow.  
 Collecting data regarding occurrence of the workflow 
errors and their prevention in the same scenario 
environment. 
 Discussing current approaches to reduce the risk of 
errors in the RIS/PACS workflow. 
The following sections show the application of each step in 
the approach to analyse the safety of the workflow with this 
radiology department. 
A. Requirements Generation 
While documenting the requirements we found that the 
ideal architecture for a RIS has a hospital information system 
(HIS) which works as a master patient index, where data goes 
immediately to the RIS without the need for a technologist to 
enter any data.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
In our case, the hospital combined the RIS and PACS and 
has them as a stand-alone departmental radiology system. They 
have a non-complete HIS that does not have full functionality 
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and is not connected to the RIS. All the data needs to be 
entered in the RIS by the clinicians. The information to be 
entered includes the following: Patient name, Patient National 
Number, Date of Birth (DoB), Age, Address, Patient medical 
Information, and Order Information. 
After the above information is entered into the RIS either 
by the clinician (as in our case) or by coming immediately 
from the HIS, then this information (which includes patient‟s 
medical, administrative, demographics, and billing 
information) is kept in the RIS, in addition to the information 
which is added at the RIS to identify the examination order. 
These may include the following: Order ID, Order Description, 
Scheduling, Patient Arrival Information, and Examination 
Room Scheduling. This discussion considers the case where 
the clinician enters part of the information into the RIS, and 
there is some information that is entered into the RIS by 
another party who might be a radiologist. After that, the output 
of the RIS goes to the modality work list (MWL) where the 
orders are scheduled to be sent to the image acquisition 
modality. Here at the image acquiCsition modality, there is no 
chance for human error as the data comes immediately from 
the RIS. However, this database, which has all the scheduling 
information and orders information, is open to hardware and 
software errors. At the image acquisition modality the patient 
is supposed to have the examination that is specified in the 
order.  The output of the image acquisition modality is patient 
id, patient name and the image itself. 
After that, these outputs are sent automatically to the PACS 
which archives them and then sends them to the diagnostic 
workstation to be seen by the radiologist. The radiologist is 
now able to interpret examinations from several clinical sites 
and/or hospitals (in the case of Tele-radiology), and produce a 
report as an output. This report is to be passed to the clinician 
to make the diagnoses and give a medicine or recommend for 
another procedure such as an operation. 
This paper considers one of the workflow scenarios; the 
purpose is to analyse possible failures of this scenario and to 
find out the root causes of these failures. This scenario is the 
workflow for a computerised tomography (CT) scanner. A CT 
scanner creates cross-sectional images of the body using X-
rays; the result is a very detailed 3D view of the body interior. 
CT scans are used to make a cancer diagnosis or assess the 
effects of cancer treatment. 
When the patient sees the clinician, the clinician decides if 
there is a need for a CT scan. Once a CT scan is recommended, 
the risk of exposure to radiation is considered before deciding 
to send the patient to the exam. This is because the 
accumulative amount of radiation the patient is exposed to has 
a potential risk for the patient, so clinicians recommend it when 
they think that the benefits will exceed possible risks. In order 
to consider the amount of radiation, in most cases the date of 
the last CT scan must be considered by the clinician before 
such a decision can be confirmed. Moreover, a pregnancy 
check must be done to make sure that the woman who will start 
the exam is not pregnant. 
Commonly, patients who will receive a CT scan must 
follow certain preparation guidelines. These include no eating 
for two hours before the appointment, and drinking 500 ml of 
water over this time. The water is useful to hydrate the patient 
before having the Contrast Media (CM) for the CT scan. 
Another preparation guideline is to ask the patient to drink 
another 500ml of water after arriving to the waiting area. It also 
helps to show the bladder on the scan.   
Verbal verification by the radiologist is needed to check 
these preparations with the patient together with other 
preparations such as ensuring there is no metal present (e.g. 
wearing of a metal belt, or jewels or having an internal device 
inside their bodies). Moreover, verbal verification of the 
patient‟s DoB at this point plays an important role in correcting 
any previous errors in the DoB, as the DoB is important in 
determining the amount of CM and the amount of radiation. 
Some patients may require a blood test before CM can be 
given. 
An injection of the contrast is often given before or 
throughout the scan. CM contains iodine and appears as white 
areas on the scans, which help the radiologist to differentiate 
between certain organs or tissues and the other structures. The 
contrast may be ingested as a drink, or injected around the 
required area, or given via a cannula which is placed in the 
patient‟s arm prior to the scan. Again, verbal verification is 
required here to confirm any allergies and medications that the 
patient takes in order to judge the suitability of the injection 
and to minimise interactions with other medications.  
Typically, people who feel claustrophobic do not have 
problems with CT scan as they might have with other scans, 
like Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). However, the 
radiographer should check this with the patient before the scan, 
as if the patient thinks that he is expecting to feel this way then 
an injection may be given before the scan to calm the patient. 
After the scan is finished, the patient should be asked to 
wait for an hour at least after the injection to make sure the 
patient is in good health, and he/she did not have allergic 
reaction to the CM injection, because people sometimes have 
different reactions; in these circumstances, medical staff should 
be able to manage different reactions appropriately. The 
radiologist then should give some instructions to the patient to 
follow once he goes home, for example, again asking the 
patient to drink 500ml of water to rehydrate the body after the 
CM injection.   
B. Workflow Modelling 
Workflow model should specify the systems involved in 
producing a medical service and different agents who are 
interacting with these systems. Moreover, it should specify the 
dataflow as well as the sequence of event. The following figure 
shows the workflow within the considered radiology 
department. Matlab Simulink was used for the modelling 
process. The information from the EHR is relayed back to the 
HIS component.  
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Fig.2. RIS/PACS Workflow 
The EHR is modelled as a subcomponent of the HIS and it 
has the following information: 
 
Fig.3. EHR Component 
The CM is modelled as a separate component 
(subcomponent of the ImageAcquisitionModality):  
 
Fig.4. The CM Component 
C. Hazards Identification 
After the analyst builds the model, the accuracy of the 
model is discussed with the healthcare experts in the hospital 
as well as the possible ways the whole workflow can fail. 
Possible faults in each component are specified. After that the 
analyst job will be to prepare the logical failure expressions 
which are appropriate for the failure annotation. 
Errors may happen at any point where there is a data entry. 
This paper focuses on the failures caused by DoB errors in the 
CT scan workflow scenario. 
A CT scan is considered as a safe procedure, although there 
can be reactions to contrast media CM which usually cannot be 
predicted [16]. 
For example, the dose of contrast media which is given to 
the patients is different for adults and children. Therefore, date 
of birth is an important factor for specifying the amount of CM 
to administer. Giving the patient an overdose of CM has 
reactions that affect patient health and put the patient in a 
hazardous situation.  
Faults may occur at different points in the workflow and 
need to be identified. 
D.  Failure Annotation 
Failure annotation is performed using the HiP-HOPS tool; 
all the components need to be annotated with possible faults. 
HiP-HOPS then analyses the model to give the fault trees that 
detects the possible failures and provide the root causes for 
them. In addition, it provides us with information about their 
effects on the output of the workflow. 
HiP-HOPS has a simple language for annotating the 
components with reusable failure logic. For example, 
            O-Out = O-In or InternalFailure 
On the left is the output deviation, which represents a 
failure propagated from an output port of the component. On 
the right is the cause of that deviation, consisting of the basic 
deviations or basic events. Both input and output deviations 
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consist of a user-defined failure class representing the type of 
failure (e.g. O= omission) and the name of the port question. 
We can annotate the same component with multiple output 
deviations, and failure annotations as well can be applied to 
subcomponents, in other words, it can be hierarchical. 
So, the interview‟s data are analysed to document the 
RIS/PACS system‟s workflow. Then the documented 
information is used to model the workflow to enable the 
automated analysis. After that, possible hazards are identified 
and failure expressions are now ready to be annotated into the 
model for several scenarios. As explained earlier this failure 
expressions describes how a failure in the component output is 
caused by a propagation of failure from the component input or 
the internal malfunction of the component itself. Failure is 
represented in the format of “FailureType-
ComponentName.ComponentPort” in HiP-HOPS.  
The first scenario analysis focuses on having side effects or 
bad reactions by the patient. As described by the system 
architecture, the effect on the patient is considered as an 
„output‟ component. This failure is represented by the value 
failure of the patient component, and so is referred to as V-
Patient.Out1.  
The patient‟s DoB is entered into HIS together with other 
information. Value failure of DoB which could be caused by 
wrong data entry is represented as V-DoB_out, also omission 
of the DoB causes problems and it is classified here as output 
deviation of the HIS. Omission of DoB is represented here as 
O-DoB_out. Moreover, HIS internal malfunctions can cause 
the output failures of the HIS; these are represented as 
HWError, SWError, and DataEntryError. 
Similarly, the clinician — who is included in the workflow 
as a separate component — can have output deviations. 
Clinician might make data entry errors which are represented 
here as IDDataEntryError or DoBDataEntryError. The output 
deviations are represented as V-PatientID_out and V-DoB_out. 
RIS internal malfunctions may include software or 
hardware malfunction, represented as HWError, SWError. RIS 
as well as potentially  receiving the wrong DoB from the 
Clinician, represented as DoBDataEntryError. In addition to 
these malfunctions, RIS may suffer from failure of the 
preparation data, which is PrpDataEntryError. Therefore, 
output deviations at RIS could be the omission of DoB or 
having the wrong DoB or having the wrong preparation 
information or omission of preparation information; these are 
represented respectively as: O-DoB_out, V-DoB_out, V-
PatientPreparationInfo, and O-PatientPreparationInfo. 
ModalityWorkList is a database, which keeps orders‟ 
scheduling information and patients‟ information. It can have 
two basic events, which are software error or hardware error. 
These are represented as SWError and HWError respectively. 
Each of the ModalityWorklist inputs has its own failure but in 
the first scenario, some failures have been considered and the 
others are ignored as they are assumed to be free from failures. 
The failures which are to be analysed are: the failure of the 
value of the DoB and the failure of the preparation information 
output either as a value failure or omission of this value. These 
are represented as V-DoB_out, V-Prep_out, and O-Prep_out. 
When it comes to the image acquisition modality itself, at 
the time of the test the radiologist should verify some 
information with the patient, e.g. DoB, name, and preparations 
for the test. The process of verbal verification is represented as 
a separate component which may have two basic events, both 
human errors; they are represented as: DoBHumanError and 
PrepHumanError. Failures of the output of this component are 
represented as: O-DOBVer and O-PrepVer. 
Fixing the cannula for the contrast medium is considered as 
well as a separate component, and annotated with the failures 
that might be a human error (represented as HumanError); the 
output failure of this component is represented as V-Out1.  
The CM dose is considered as a subcomponent of the 
image acquisition modality and failure of this is giving the 
wrong dose for the patient. This is represented as V-Dose, 
which can be caused by either wrong dose calculation or wrong 
measurement. Other reactions are considered as well as 
subcomponents of the image acquisition modality component, 
which may have a failure that is represented as V-Reaction, 
where the patient has some reactions or Side effects when he is 
not supposed to have them. These kinds of reactions that 
happen according to not following the preparation guidelines 
by the patient are separated from the CM dose-dependent 
reactions. 
The output of the CMDose component and OtherReactions 
component goes to the Reaction component. This separate 
component is annotated as well with possible failures. The 
output deviation of this component is having any type of 
reactions by the patient. This is represented as V-Reaction. 
The reactions component is connected to the patient who is 
having these reactions. The image output is connected to the 
PACS component that receives the images and archives them 
into a database.  
We did not annotate both the PACS and the diagnostic 
workstations component with failure information for the 
purpose of this scenario. We assumed that they only propagate 
failures. A comprehensive analysis must consider failures of 
these components and annotate them with all possible errors to 
get the root causes for the other possible failures of the 
workflow. 
There are other scenarios that may possibly cause defective 
results, but again, for simplicity, they are not covered in this 
paper. For example, when the patient gives information to the 
clinician, the patient might not tell the right information about 
his situation and the clinician might not check. Those two 
conditions together result in creating the wrong history for the 
patient. When the clinician has the wrong information, he or 
she will ask for the wrong exam order that in turn causes the 
wrong examination description. At the time of the examination, 
if the patient did not tell and the radiographer did not verify 
this, and he or she has the wrong exam description, these 
conditions together might give a false report for the patient, 
which results in an incorrect procedure or the wrong 
medication. 
Another failure that can potentially cause patient harm but 
is not considered in this paper is when images are mislabelled 
for the wrong patient and/or the wrong study. These kinds of 
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failures result in images that are incorrectly associated with the 
patient‟s EHR and may lead to incorrect diagnoses, 
medication, or procedures. 
Other failures might happen because of an incorrect entry 
for the DoB of the patient, which occurs when the clinician 
enters the wrong DoB in both the HIS and the RIS. These 
faults together result in the wrong DoB of the patient which 
cause an incorrect dose of both radiation and the CM. Here the 
patient is under the risk of extra dose of radiation and dose 
dependent reactions of CM. The dose dependent reactions of 
CM are analysed in this paper. 
E. Fault Tree and FMEA Synthesis and Analysis 
We annotated the components of the model with the 
corresponding logical failure information and then performed 
the root cause analysis. At present, as sufficient numerical data 
for the components are not available therefore the numerical 
data associated with components are not entered as part of the 
annotation. HiP-HOPS synthesises and analyses the system 
fault trees and produces the FTA and FMEA results, which 
shows how the value failure in an input and the component 
failures (or their combinations) can lead to the failure in 
causing unintended reactions or side effects towards the 
patients.  
The following figure shows the FTA result. For simplicity, 
V-Reaction is represented as Unintended Reaction in the FTA 
and FMEA table: 
Unintended Reactions
DoB Verification Error 
RIS DOB
 Data Entry Error
HIS DoB 
Data Entry Error
Clinician DoB 
Data Entry Error
Preparation
 Verification 
Error
RIS Preparation 
Data Entry Error
Cannula Fixation Error
Wrong Dose of CM
Wrong DoB
Wrong Measurements
Wrong Dose 
Calculation
Human Error
Wrong Preparation of 
Patient 
 
Fig.5. FTA Result 
The following list shows the MCS [4] from the FTA: 
TABLE.I. MCS FROM FTA 
 
The following table shows the resulting FMEA table of the 
direct and further effects: 
TABLE.II. FMEA TABLE 
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To summarise, the FTA and FMEA results show that the 
following failures may lead to the failure of the first scenario 
(which is in this case getting unwanted reactions by the 
patient):  
 Human error in fixing the cannula for the CM, where 
the radiologist or the nurse makes an error in placing 
the cannula prior the scan. This mistake cause 
problems for the patient as the CM is injected through 
the scan, which might lead to both side effects of the 
CM or extra dose of radiation because radiologist 
might need to repeat the scan. 
 Data entry error for the DoB by the clinician combined 
with an error in the verbal verification of the DoB by 
the radiologist at the time of the scanning. This 
combination of errors might lead to an extra dose of 
radiation and/or extra dose of CM, which may put 
patient‟s life at risk.  
 Data entry error for the DoB by the radiologist 
combined with an error in the verbal verification of the 
DoB by the radiologist at the time of the scanning. 
Again this focuses our attention on the importance of 
the verification of the DoB by the radiologist at the 
time of the scanning. 
 Data entry error for the preparation guidelines by the 
radiologist combined with an error in the verbal 
verification of the preparation guidelines by the 
radiologist at the time of the scanning. This means, if 
the patient received the wrong preparation guidelines 
or did not receive them at all, then at the time of the 
scanning, if the radiologist does not make sure about 
their accuracy (and whether they were followed by the 
patient or not), the patient will experience the 
reactions. 
 Data entry error for the DoB in the HIS combined with 
an error in the verbal verification of the DoB by the 
radiologist at the time of the scanning. 
 Wrong measurements to calculate the dose of CM can 
directly cause the unwanted reactions. This might 
happen because of not understanding the units of 
measurements, or using wrong equipment to measure 
the dosages.  
 Human error in calculating the dose can directly cause 
the reactions. This may happen through making slips in 
calculations that result in wrong dose. 
This means that if there is any error in the data entry in 
HIS, clinician, and the RIS, combined with a situation where 
the radiologist does not verify (or verifies incorrectly) the data 
for DoB or preparation information, the unintended reactions 
towards the patient will occur.  
These errors can be avoided by adding extra functionality 
to the HIS or RIS or both of them (for example, bar coded 
patients help to avoid data entry errors by radiologists and 
clinicians). Moreover, adding extra tasks in the workflow may 
help to avoid the errors. 
    Human error in fixing the cannula for the CM also 
contributes directly to the unintended reactions. So, 
radiologists or nurses who perform this task should be 
informed about potential failures which it may cause and about 
their direct and indirect effects on the patient. As mentioned 
earlier, the numerical data for the components of the system in 
the case study are not considered; hence, quantitative analysis 
is not performed in this paper.  
F. New Workflow Design and Accreditation of the Workflow 
     A new workflow can be proposed with some additional 
tasks and avoiding the potential failures. Existing critical tasks 
may be highlighted as important tasks to focus the attention of 
the healthcare team to the importance of this task.   
     The model optimisation capability of HiP-HOPS [17] 
can also produce different alternative models to help to achieve 
safety requirements, and in doing so it can assist in selecting 
component and subsystems among different alternatives as 
well as helping to decide the level and location of replicated 
components.  
G. Evaluation of the Approach 
To evaluate our approach the concerns about the 
application of the approach to analyse the safety of clinical 
workflows were discussed with both healthcare and technical 
experts in a systematic manner. The approach is found to have 
the required usability; it is tool based and a user friendly 
graphical modelling tool (Matlab Simulink) is used for the 
modelling process. Of course, the analyst‟s ability to create the 
models has a non-trivial impact on the accuracy of the models. 
However, the approach suggests that models should be checked 
and approved by healthcare experts before proceeding with the 
other steps.  
In comparison with other methods which are already in use 
for safety analysis (e.g. Bayesian Networks (BNs) which is 
primarily used for quantitative analysis), the modelling phase 
in our approach requires less technical knowledge. For 
example, modelling workflows in BNs to facilitate safety 
analysis requires specialised technical knowledge and there are 
no well-defined rules to create BNs of a workflow for safety 
analysis purposes. As a result a system can have a number of 
equivalent BNs and if the causal relationships between 
different nodes are not well-defined then BNs can become 
unnecessarily complex and non-coherent. Therefore BNs of a 
workflow may be not be understandable by healthcare experts, 
thus it may not be possible to involve the healthcare experts in 
the early design phase though their involvement is highly 
required. However, BNs are efficient methods to perform 
quantitative analysis under uncertainty and a coherent and 
relatively simple BN can be created by translating other 
representations, e.g. Fault Trees into BNs. As mentioned 
earlier, analysts can benefit from the capability of BNs by 
using them in the stages where the healthcare experts are not 
involved. In our approach, healthcare experts are no more 
involved in the safety analysis process after the workflow has 
modelled.  Therefore when fault trees are generated by the 
HiP-HOPs tool then they can be translated into BNs, thus 
benefit from the strength of the BNs while involvements of the 
healthcare experts are also ensured. 
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  Even though other modelling techniques can be beneficial, 
for example, finite state machines can be used to model the 
workflow, it is not easy to analyse the state machines directly 
to obtain safety related information about the workflow. In this 
case, state machine based model will be required to be 
transformed to other models e.g. fault trees, Markov chains, 
Bayesian Networks. Another issue of state machine based 
approach is that they increasingly face state explosion problem, 
i.e., for a relatively complex workflow, number of states 
required to model the complete failure behaviour of the 
workflow grows exponentially with the number of components 
of the workflow, thus are difficult to create and analyse. 
The process of hazards identification is done by the analyst 
in cooperation with the healthcare experts. The hazards should 
be specified for each component and possible failures for each 
component and their causes are discussed. After that the 
process of failure annotation needs to be done by the analyst 
who should have experience in using the HiP-HOPS. In terms 
of usability, HiP-HOPS has a graphical user interface which is 
easy to use, and it does not need an expert as it is 
uncomplicated in comparison with the other methods.  
In comparison with other model checking [18] or 
simulation approaches, HiP-HOPS is less automated than these 
approaches. However, it is generally faster and more scalable 
and can be used to complement other techniques such as 
simulation. Recent work on the systematic application of HiP-
HOPS and model checking [19] also opens the opportunity to 
extend the analysis with model checking in future. HiP-HOPS  
also serves as a useful foundation for related technologies such 
as optimisation [20]. And, the model optimisation capability of 
HiP-HOPS can produce different alternative models to achieve 
safety requirements and can help to select component and 
subsystem among different alternatives as well as helps to 
decide the level and location of replicated components.  
Workflow models are reusable and maintainable; that is if a 
certain workflow has been done for a certain department, then 
the analyst can use it as a subcomponent in another workflow 
and it can be easily maintained as well if there is a need to do 
this. 
The safety analysis approach has the potential to affect both 
the workflow and the clinical service quality. The approach 
supports a large part of the workflow development process, in 
particular the design phase of the development process. The 
clinical service quality (which is the output of the clinical 
workflow) is improved and maintained through specifying the 
exact safe steps or baths which can lead to the service.  
In the case where a workflow management system is 
required, then the approach has the potential to help in 
developing a reliable workflow management system; as the 
approach improves the quality of the design phase which leads 
to a better quality in the following software engineering stages. 
It is generally accepted that a high quality product requires 
a high quality design. Theoretically, we can generate a 
hypothesis that if a high-quality safety analysis approach is 
maintained, its output has the potential to help in preparing 
high-quality and reliable clinical workflows.   
Data on the applicability of the proposed approach were 
gathered through an informal testing shown positive usability 
and effective results. Our results were discussed with experts in 
the hospital where the data were collected and they appreciated 
the ability of the approach to focus on processes and how this 
could be employed for several applications in clinical 
workflows. Moreover, having the fact that our analysis results 
are happening in the hospital as actual failures has the potential 
to validate our approach.  
Our approach drew the map for the root causes of these 
failures. This is the major contribution of this work as to date 
there is a lack of automated tools which allow the modelling 
and analysis of real-world workflows. The approach provides 
an effective means to accomplish this goal, is able to provide a 
valid theoretical framework consisting of modelling the 
processes and sub processes and their error analysis. The study 
findings contribute towards a larger research effort being 
proposed for reducing medical errors and enhancing patient 
safety. 
Dependability can be improved based on the analysis from 
the tool: the workflow can be adapted, with workflow 
components substituted with more reliable components, 
components can be replicated to introduce redundancy and the 
frequency of maintenance can be increased for critical 
components. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
The automated identification of these root causes allows 
greater understanding of the factors contributing to the 
undesired event which can potentially lead to a serious clinical 
risk. This enables the identification of weak points, which 
could then be effectively addressed and improved. 
The simple act of undertaking a safety analysis in this way 
helps to improve understanding of the behavior of the 
workflow and its potential for failure, thus highlighting areas 
where additional checks or amendments to the workflow need 
to be introduced. The automation then additionally helps deal 
with the complexity and time cost issues, offering benefits over 
a simple manual analysis. While in this case there were only 
order 2 MCS, more comprehensive analyses might introduce 
even higher order MCS that are even more difficult to spot 
manually, potentially highlighting issues that are not even 
apparent from a manual analysis.  
For example, through the simple structure in this example, 
the application of HiP-HOPS shows the ability to 
systematically assist in the identification of failures in the 
workflow (i.e. failure in the verbal verification or failure in the 
data entry of the DoB) and the identification of the failures in 
the system (i.e. hardware or software error in the MWL). This 
information can be used to guide the improvement in the 
design of both the system and the workflow. The system can be 
improved by targeting the areas where highly-reliable 
components and fault tolerant mechanisms can be prioritised 
and introduced to make the architecture more robust and fault 
tolerant.  
Moreover, the workflow can be improved by designing the 
workflow in a way which takes the safety analysis into 
consideration and to use the results of the analysis to target 
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areas where reliable components (in this case the components 
are processes and tasks) can be introduced. The workflow 
should have an exact determination of the processes, tasks, and 
the procedures which must be done by each party. 
Having this detailed workflow with a detailed analysis of 
the failure behaviour can enable healthcare organisations to 
develop material to be used by medical staff in safety training 
workshops. These workshops should help the medical staff to 
build safety awareness that may be useful to avoid the expected 
failures in the workflow. 
Using HiP-HOPS in workflow analysis in general has the 
potential to give effective analysis by detecting possible design 
flaws early before serious problems happen. This also helps to 
provide the medical staff the awareness they require and aids in 
redesigning the workflow to produce an effective and fault free 
workflow. 
Moreover, such modelling of the workflow and the analysis 
results can also be used as an educational tool for training of 
radiologists, nurses, and clinicians. This helps the trainees in 
identifying errors and preventing the potential errors from 
leading to adverse events. 
   The example presented in this paper is based on one 
scenario, while different scenarios need to be modelled and 
analysed to get a comprehensive analysis of the workflow. 
Moreover, conducting research of this nature on only one 
location is limiting, and having more sites opens a wider range 
of failures determination. 
V. FUTURE WORK 
   HiP-HOPS is designed to consider local failures, where 
each component and its outputs/inputs has its own failure data. 
In clinical workflows, sometimes we may have the case where 
all components share the same cause of failure (e.g. human 
failure). The common cause failure idea allows this to be 
modelled, and this could be an improved way to model human 
failures in future. 
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